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Analysis of the European Court of
Justice's Decision on
Competence in the World Trade
Organization: Who Will Call the Shots in
the Areas of Services and Intellectual
Property in the European Union?
JAMES J. CALLAGHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Contracting parties signed the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Final Act)' under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 on April 15,
1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco. The signing of the Final Act
concluded the most far-reaching liberalization operation of world
trade in history.3 The Uruguay Round, which lasted 2,643 days,
succeeded in cutting tariffs, opening markets, and "bringing new
areas of cross-border economic activity under international rules
for the first time.",
4
* B.A., DePaul University, 1992; J.D., University of 'Pittsburgh, 1996; M.P.I.A.,
University of Pittsburgh, 1996. I wish to extend special thanks to Professor Ronald A.
Brand for his insightful criticism and tireless support in both this article and during my
legal studies. I also thank to Professor Alberta M. Sbragia who provided helpful feedback
and who has had tremendous impact on my interest in the law and politics of the European
Union.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (World Trade Org. 1995) [hereinafter Final Act].
2. GATI was established after World War II to deal with recurring problems of
protectionism in the international trade arena. The GATT contract is an agreement in
itself and an institutional manifestation of the trade agreement process. The role of GA1T
was to provide a structure for the process of trade liberalization. See GILBERT R.
WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 43 (1992).
3. The Uruguay Round, RAPID, Apr. 12, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, ALLEUR File.
4. Id
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The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round directly
impacts the European Union (EU) because the EU accounts for
twenty percent of exports in world goods and approximately thirty
percent of exports in services.5 Significantly, exports of goods and
services account for almost twenty-five percent of the EU gross
domestic product (GDP). The estimated one-time gain to the EU
from the Uruguay Round is a sixty-five billion Ecus boost to the
EU economy.6 The Uruguay Round also will lead to the creation
of several hundred thousand new jobs throughout the EU.
The problem for the EU is that the World Trade Organization
(WTO) encompasses two areas pertaining to international trade:
(1) trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), and (2) trade-related intellectual property issues
(TRIPS).9 Article II of the Final Act sets forth the scope of the
WTO and states that "[t]he WTO shall provide the common
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among
its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.",o
This Article examines the recent decision of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) 12 regarding the respective competencies of
5. Id.
6. Id. The Ecu or "European Currency Unit" was established out of a basket of
currencies that participated in-the European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS was to
provide an exchange rate mechanism (ERM) linking the currencies of the Member States
with limits on how much each currency would be permitted to fluctuate against its partners.
One of the goals of the EMS was to pave the way for the full-scale monetary union. See
DEREK URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINCE 1945 182-83 (1992). Beginning on January 1,1999, the single European currency will
be known as the "Euro." This name is meant as a full name and not as a prefix to be
attached to the national currency names. See EU: Madrid Summit, Reuter Textline, Dec.
18, 1995, available in LEXIS, TXTLNE Library.
7. Id.
8. Final Act, supra note 1, Annex lB.
9. Id. Annex 1C.
10. Id. art. II (emphasis added).
11. Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements
Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property-Article 228(6) of the EEC
Treaty (Nov. 15, 1994) (forthcoming, on file with author) [hereinafter WTO Opinion].
12. The ECJ is charged with judicial review of the Community's acts and those of the
Member States. See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in EURO-POLITICS:
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 124 (Alberta
M. Sbragia ed., 1992) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING]. Each institutional
organ of the Community may judicially "challenge the legality of one another's acts without
the need to show any particular injury." Id. Member States may challenge acts of the
Community by bringing an action before the court. Id Individuals may also seek review
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the Member States and the institutions of the EU (Community) 3
in the newly formed areas of GATS and TRIPS. 4 The EU
Commission (Commission) 5 instituted a request for the ECJ's
decision pursuant to Article 228(6)16 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (EEC Treaty). The Commission sought
confirmation from the ECJ that the Community, rather than the
Member States, had exclusive competence to act for the EU in the
areas of GATS and TRIPS. 7 In response, the EC.J affirmed the
Community's exclusive competence in matters pertaining to
international trade in goods." The ECI's decision, however, also
stated that the Community must share competence with the'
Member States in matters pertaining to GATS and TRIPS. 9
Part II of this article provides background to the Community
and the ECJ decision. Part III examines GATS and TRIPS in
order to understand their potential effect on European law. The
where they can show "some particularized, individual detriment flowing from a Community
act." Id. at 125. Under Articles 169'and 170 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission or a
Member State may bring an action in the ECJ against another Member State for violating
its obligations under the Treaty. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 100A(4).
13. The entity that has become the EU has gone through many changes since its
inception in 1957,. including several name changes. The original "European Community"
was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). See Mark Jones, Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 3 (1994). It was followed
by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC). Id. The most important of the Communities is the EEC, which first
changed its name to the European Community (EC) in the Single European Act of the
1992 Project. Id. The former EC changed its name to the European Union (EU) after the
Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty; however, the term "community" still
refers to the institutional structure of what is now known as the EU. Id.
14. Id.
15. The Commission is the executive of the Community and has driven the EU toward
further integration. The Commission has a virtual monopoly on the ability to propose
legislation, but it is dependent on the Council of Ministers (Council) to adopt those.
proposals. See infra note 28, for an explanation of the Council. For further discussion on
the Commission, see B. Guy Peters, Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the
European Community, in INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING, supra note 12, at 85-89. See
also Peter Ludlow, The European Commission, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
DECISION MAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 85 (Rbbert 0. Keohane & Stanley
Hoffman eds., 1991) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE).
16. EEC TREATY art. 228(1)." This article mandates that "the Council, the Commission
or a Member State may obtain an opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an
agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of the Treaty." Id.
17. Stephen Nisbet, Court Rules On Shareout of EU Trade Powers, Reuter European
Community Report, Nov. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, TXTWE File.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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"internal" and "external" characteristics of both GATS and TRIPS
are particularly significant in relation to their effect on the Com-
munity. These distinctions figure prominently in the ECJ's decision
regarding shared competence.
Part IV analyzes the ECJ's decision regarding shared com-
petency for GATS and TRIPS within the context of Article 113,
which delineates the Community's common external policy, and
other relevant articles. As developed, the ECJ's decision could
easily have, found authority for exclusive competence to the
Community. In addition, prior ECJ opinions give Article 113 a
much broader interpretation than the Court used in its decision
finding shared competency. ° Part IV also examines Missouri v.
Holland,2' a U.S. Supreme Court case that involved sovereignty
issues in the area of treaty-making. The purpose is to compare the
U.S. perspective on preemption with that of the Community.
Part V discusses the possible effects that sharing competence
will have on the Community's ability to participate in the WTO in
matters regarding GATS and TRIPS. A recent incident involving
the French representative during a GATT dispute resolution
process illustrates existing confusion and the potential difficulties
from shared competence.' Part V also examines the Council's
Legal Service suggestions to the Community and the Member
States for coordinating their policy efforts under shared com-
petence.' Part VI concludes that the ECJ's decision has es-
tablished an unwieldy framework that will result in confusion for
the Community, Member States, and their trade partners.
II. BACKGROUND
Before the inception of the European Economic Community,
GATT reviewed the Schuman Plan24 and the EEC Treaty to
20. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 110.
21. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
22. European Economic Community---Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-feed Proteins, GATF Doc. C/M/222 (June 16,
1988) (minutes of Council meeting) [hereinafter Payments and Subsidies Paid].
23. Council Legal Service Note 10779/93 on Detailed Arrangements for the
Participation of Community and the Member States in the MTO [WTO], 1993 O.J. 1
[hereinafter Legal Service Note].
24. The Schuman Plan proposed that Western European countries and a new
supranational authority conjointly administer coal and steel resources. The purpose of the
Plan was to gradually eliminate all tariffs in these heavy industries as between the
participating parties. See URWIN, supra note 6, at 44.
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ensure conformity of the Community to GATT principles.' The
Commission has been representing the Member States of the EU
in GATT negotiations since May 4, 1964.26 The mandate for the
Commission's role as the EU's representative in GAIT is located
in Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, which states:
[T]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform
principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of
dumping or subsidies.27
The Council of Ministers (Council)' gives the Commission
negotiators a precise mandate, a document that the Council has
already heavily negotiated.29 Provided Commission negotiators
remain within the confines of their mandate, the Council is likely
to approve any subsequent agreements. ° Consequently, Commis-
sion negotiators are very restricted; otherwise, they risk having the
Council overturn any agreement with their GAIT partners.
This mandate structure creates inflexibility within the Com-
munity. The Community process creates constraints on its
negotiators that are "legal, relatively well-known and certain, and
25. DOMINIK LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 7 (3d ed. 1984). Article XXIV of GATT
provides for a set of criteria to which customs unions and free trade areas must abide. See
Youri Devuyst, GATT Customs Union Provisions and the Uruguay Round: The European
Community Experience, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 15 (1992). Although the concepts of customs
unions and free trade areas appear to directly contradict the concept of Most Favored
Nation treatment embodied in Article I of GATT, Article XXIV stipulates that "[t]he
contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the develop-
ment, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the
countries parties to such agreements." Id. at 18.
26. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 25, at 6.
27. EEC TREATY art. 113.
28. The Council is an institution similar to one found in a conventional international
organization. Peters, supra note 15, at 78. It is comiprised of Member State ministers from
various areas of policy-making and represents the interests of the Member States. Id. Its
interactions depend heavily on diplomacy and bargaining among the representatives of the
national governments. Id. The Council is the body in which legislation is either accepted
or rejected, but the Council has no power to propose legislation. Id. at 78-79. See also
Wolfgang Wessels, The EC CounciL. The 'Community's Decisionmaking Center, in
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 15, at 133-55.
29. WINHAM, supra note 2, at 88.
30. Id.
1996]
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especially felt during the negotiation."31  In contrast, constraints
on U.S. negotiators "are political, uncertain, and especially felt at
the end of the negotiation."32 These constraints create different
negotiation capabilities, as evidenced in the Uruguay Round. 3
For example, the U.S. delegation was able to propose drastic
options such as the complete elimination of agricultural subsidies.
Because of its constraining mandate, however, the Community was
unable to respond effectively to the flexible bargaining tactics of
the United States
From the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the Commission
argued that it should have exclusive competence over the new
areas in the WTO relating to international trade. 5 Pursuant to
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission enjoys exclusive
competence over international trade in goods.3 6  The Commis-
sion's position was that "[a]ny weakening of the Community's
negotiating position due to its inability to agree on a joint approach
could have serious implications for Europe's commercial future."37
As the Uruguay Round neared completion, the Commission
again pushed for exclusive competence in GATS and TRIPS.
According to the Commission, "the EU's trading partners were not
interested in negotiating 12 separate deals with the Member States
and the completion of the Uruguay Round only confirmed the
Commission's competence to speak for the EU as a whole."38
The Member States, particularly Britain and France, backed by the
Council and the European Parliament (EP), 9 argued that Article
113 did not encompass these new areas and that the Commission
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Id. at 88-89.
35. See Programme of the Commission for 1986, in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Supp.
1/86 (Feb. 19, 1986).
36. EEC TREATY art. 113.
37. Programme of the Commission for 1986, supra note 35.
38. GA TT/WTO: EU Court Rules On Mixed Commission/Council Trading Competence,
European Information Service, Nov. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
ALLEUR File [hereinafter GATT/WTO]. With the accession of Austria, Sweden, and
Finland, the EU now consists of fifteen Member States. Id.
39. The EP is the third main political institution of the EU and is comprised of
members elected at the European level, or Euro MP's. See Peters, supra note 15, at 90-92.
Although traditionally lacking significant power, the EP has begun to compensate for what
many consider to be a democratic deficit in the Community. Id. The Single European Act
and Maastricht Treaty substantially increased the powers of the EP. Id.
[Vol. 18:497
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should share competence in these areas with the Member States.
The Member States claimed that neither the EEC Treaty nor the
WTO contained specific demands for a single negotiator to
represent the Community in the new areas of GATS and
TR=PS.
40
That the Member States should be concerned over who has
competence in the newly-formed GATS and TRIPS might appear
odd. The Commission has apparently done a successful job of
representing the twelve countries in the Uruguay Round; however,
the continuing battle over who holds competence in the various
policy-making areas is a necessary characteristic of European
integration.
The EU has an elaborate institutional framework for deciding
whether the Community has exclusive competence, the Member
States have retained competence, or the competence is shared.4
Areas over which the EU institutions have exclusive competence
include competition policy,42 transportation policy,43 and com-
mercial policy." Many other areas exist where the Member
States share competence with the EU.45 GATS and TRIPS
constitute new areas of international agreement and therefore
require another determination of competence between the
Community and the Member States.
III. DISCUSSION OF GATS AND TRIPS
The issues of services and intellectual property figured
prominently in the Uruguay Round. Services are crucial because
the service sector has. surpassed the industrial sector in its
economic prominence in several developed countries. In his
delivery speech at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations on
September 16, 1986, Community negotiator Willy de Clercq noted:
40. GATTWTO, supra note 38.
41. Generally, the EEC Treaty explicitly provides the boundaries of the Community's
competence. See, e.g., EEC TREATY tits. V-VIL. The Community can also increase its
competence by subsequent legislative acts. Id.
42. EEC TREATY tit. V (providing for common rules on competition, taxation, and
approximation of laws).
43. EEC TREATY tit. IV (providing for common rules on transport policy).
44. EEC TREATY tit. VII (providing for a common commercial policy).
45. The recent passage of the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty,
added a number of new areas in which the Community and the Member States enjoy
concurrent competence. See Robert Lane, New Community Competences Under the
Maastricht Treaty, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 939, 945 (1993).
1996]
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"Services today constitute one of the most dynamic features of the
world economy [so it is] essential to negotiate a multilateral
framework of principles and rules and to devise... specific
disciplines by sector or group of sectors. The aim must be to
increase transparency and to liberalize trade., 46 According to the
Commission, certain economists see the area of services as
a harbinger of a fundamental restructuring of the world
economy in which ordinary manufacturing would shift more and
more to developing economies and they would, therefore,
become the main exporters of manufactured goods. The
developed economies would mainly export services and goods
with high value added (with a high knowledge component).47
The Commission attributes the lag in service industry growth
outside of the Member States' borders to the lack of international
rules providing security and predictability.48
The primary objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are to reduce
impediments to international trade, to promote effective protection
of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that enforcement of
intellectual property rights does not itself become a barrier to
legitimate trade. 9 As de Clercq noted:
The absence of adequate protection in the case of intellectual
property has led to considerable distortions in trade in certain
sectors. The GAIT can and must act in parallel with other
institutions in framing principles and rules relating to the trade
aspects of intellectual property. Our aim in this area... must
be to create a favorable, dynamic climate which will give a fresh
boost to the world economy.5°
The lack of effective protection for intellectual property rights
in countries trading with the EU has much the same effect on
goods subject to intellectual property rights as other restrictions on
imports that were handled under the old GATT. The inclusion of
GATS and TRIPS in the WTO is thus of major importance to the
Community as it will boost trade in services and increase protec-
tion for the Community's intellectual property.
46. Willy de Clercq, Speech Delivered at the Uruguay Round (Sept. 16, 1986), in
BULL EUR. COMMUNmES No. 9-1986, at 15 (1986).
47. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 14.
48. Id.
49. Final Act, supra note 1, Annex 1C, pmbl.
50. de Clereq, supra note 46, at 15.
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A. The Scope of GATS and the Adopted Methods for the
Achievement of its Objectives
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO includes
GATS as Annex lB. GATS attempts to transpose the principles
of GATr into the area of services by lowering the trade barriers
which take the form of rules relating to both market access and
qualifications of those providing the services.51 Article I of GATS
provides its scope and states: "This Agreement applies to measures
by Members affecting trade in services."52 Article 1(2) continues:
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined
as the supply of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Member into the
territory of any other Member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service
consumer of any other Member;
(c) by a service supplier of one member, through
commercial presence in the territory of any
other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through
presence of natural persons of a Member in
the territory of any other Member.53
This concept of services is very broad. In effect, it encompasses
"any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise
of governmental authority."'54
Article 1(3) states:
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "measures by Members" [referred to in
Article I(1)] means measures taken by:
I(i) central, regional, or local governments and
authorities; and
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of
powers delegated by central, regional or local
governments or authorities.
In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the Agree-
ment, each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may
51. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 14.
52. Final Act, supra note 1, Annex 1B, art. 1(1).
53. Id. art. 1(2).
54. Id. art. I(3)(b). For a discussion of the importance of Article I(2)'s categorization
of the various types of services in the ECJ's division of competency under GATS, see infra
part IV.
1996] 505
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be available to it to ensure their observance by regional and
local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies
within its territory.1
5
Under Article 1(3) of GATS, the EU must first determine
which governmental body is appropriate when dealing with GATS:
central, regional, or local governments of the individual Member
States, or the collective institutions of the EU. This determination
raises the further question of whether the individual Member
States or the collective Community is responsible for compliance
with GATS.
Article II of GATS provides for Most Favored Nation (MEFN)
treatment for trade in services.56 The concept of MFN is respon-
sible for the success of GATT in the realm of trade in goods.
Paragraph 1 of this article states that "[w]ith respect to any
measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers
of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country."'  Thus, if a Member of the WTO grants favorable
treatment for services to another country, even if that other
country is not a member of the WTO, it must grant- like treatment
to all other members of the WTO. Furthermore, when a WTO
member lowers barriers to trade in services, it facilitates liberaliza-
tion as to all other members.
Parts III and IV of GATS contain specific commitments with
respect to service suppliers. Each Member promises to provide
market access to the services and service suppliers of any other
Member" and treatment that is no less favorable than it gives to
its own services and service suppliers.59 Article XVI(2) obligates
Members to refrain from imposing quantitative restrictions on the
activities of service suppliers of other Members ° These commit-
ments, however, are neither unconditional nor absolute. Any
55. Final Act, supra note 1, art. I(3)(a).
56. Id. art. II(1).
57. Id.
58. Id. art. XVI.
59. Id. art. XVII. The principal of national treatment is another important component
of GATT that has been transposed onto the realm of services. It ensures that suppliers of
services from one Member will have an opportunity to compete with the domestic suppliers
of the same service from another Member on a level playing field. ld
. 60. Id. art. XVI(2).
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Member may state in its schedule 61 that it is not affording un-
qualified market access or that it is imposing conditions or
restrictions.6'
One example of such restrictions, which the Council cited in
the WTO Opinion, is "the establishment of 'quotas' in the
audiovisual sector."'6 During negotiations in the Uruguay Round,
the French were concerned with protecting their audiovisual sector
from the flood of U.S. films that would result if France was forced
to remove the existing restrictions. The issue of competence is
important in determining whether France.could maintain a certain
level of restrictions on the importation of films. If the ECJ found
the Member States competent in this area, France could set its own
schedule of restrictions on foreign films. If the ECJ found that the
EU has exclusive competence over GATS, however, whether these
restrictions could be individually maintained or whether a unified
schedule for the EU would eliminate France's special restrictions.
B. The Scope of TRIPS and the Methods Adopted for the
Achievement of its Objectives
The preamble of Annex 1C, which deals with TRIPS, specifies
'the need to reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade and to promote effective protection of intellectual property
rights.' It also seeks to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade.6' TRIPS, however, seeks only to
establish a minimum level of protection for intellectual property,
leaving the Members free to implement more extensive protection
61. Article XX of GATS, entitled "Schedules of Specific Commitments," states, in part:
1. Each Member shall set out in a schedule the specific commitments it
undertakes under Part III of this Agreement. With respect to sectors where
such commitments are undertaken, each Schedule shall specify:
(a) terms, limitations and conditions on market access;
(b) conditions and qualifications on national treatment;
(c) undertakings relating to additional commitments;
(d) where appropriate the time-frame for implementation of such commit-
ments; and
(e) the date of entry into force of such commitments.
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, 1947, art. XX, reprinted in LAW & PRACTicE OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Joseph F. Dennin ed., 1995).
62. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Final Act, supra note 1, Annex IC, pmbl.
65. Id.
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and determine the most appropriate method of giving effect to its
provisions.'
The TRIPS Agreement is extremely broad in its scope,
covering literary and artistic property and industrial property.67
TRIPS also incorporates the principles of national treatment' and
MFN.69 Certain exceptions, however, exist to these two princi-
ples. For example, the principle of national treatment is subject to
the exceptions provided in other bodies of law dealing with
intellectual property rights, such as the Paris Convention on
Industrial Property" and the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works.7'
The EU Council noted that the objectives of TRIPS are
pursued in two different ways. First, TRIPS defines objectives by
referring to international conventions, which, in the words of the
Commission of the EU, enjoy "a relatively wide degree of accep-
tance., 72 Second, the agreement defines objectives by means of
certain substantive provisions "in areas of intellectual property
where the participating countries felt the immediate need to extend
the areas of protection.9
73
IV. THE DECISION OF THE ECJ
The Council and the Member States of the EU broadened the
Commission's scope after approving the Punta del Este Ministerial
Declaration of September 20,1986, the document that launched the
Uruguay Round.74 They decided that "in order to ensure the
maximum consistency in the conduct of the negotiations,.., the
Commission would act as the sole negotiator on behalf of the
Community and the Member States" in the areas of GATS and
TRIPS.', The minutes of the meeting contain a notation that the
66. Id. art. 1(1).
67. TRIPS covers copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications of provenance and
origin, patents, designs and models, and expertise. Id. Annex IC, pt. II.
68. Id. Annex 1C, art. 3.
69. Id. art. 4.
70. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, done July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
71. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,1886,
as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
72. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 19.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 103.
75. Id
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Council's "decision [did] not prejudge the question of the com-
petence of the Community or the Member States on particular
issues." '76 Thus, the issue of competence was present from the
very beginning of the negotiations.
At its meetings on March 7 and 8, 1994, the EU Council
authorized the President of the Council and Commissioner Sir
Leon Brittain to sign the Final Act and the WTO Agreement on
behalf of the Council. Although certain Member States argued
that those acts "also cover[ed] matters of national competence,"
they agreed to sign the Final Act and WTO Agreemen.t77 The
Commission, however, recorded in the minutes of the meeting that
"the Final Act... and the agreements annexed thereto fall
exclusively within the competence of the European Coin-
munity. '  On April 6, 1994, the Commission submitted its
request for an Opinion to the ECJ seeking resolution of the
following questions:
(1) Does the European Community have the competence to
conclude all parts of the Agreement establishing the WTO
concerning trade in Services (GATS) and the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in
counterfeit goods (TRIPS) on the basis of the EC Treaty,
more particularly on the basis of Article 113 EC alone, or
in combination with Article 100a EC and/or Article 235
EC?
(2) Does the European Community have the competence to
conclude alone also those parts of the WTO Agreement
which concern products and/or services falling exclusively
within the scope of application of the ECSC [European
Coal and Steel Community] and the EAEC [European
Atomic Energy Community] Treaties?79
(3) If the answer to the above two questions is in the affir-
mative, does this affect the ability of Member States to
conclude the WTO Agreement, in the light of. the
agreement already reached that they will be original
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id. at 103, 104.
79. Id. at 104. The Commission's exclusive competence over these areas was never
disputed, and the ECJ spent little time on the subject except to affirm the Commission's
competence. Id.
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Members of the WTO?*°
Spain objected to the admissibility of the Commission's
request for the opinion because "the procedure for seeking an
opinion pursuant to Article 228 can be initiated only where the
Community has not yet entered into an international commit-
ment.", 8  Spain argued that the signing of the Final Act served to
"authenticate the texts resulting from the negotiations and entailed
an obligation on the part of the signatories to submit them for the
approval of their respective authorities. The Council and the
Government of the Netherlands also expressed doubts about
whether a signed agreement could be subject to Article 228 given
the language of the Article. 3
The ECJ, however, held that
[t]he Court may be called upon to state its opinion pursuant to
Article 228(6) of the Treaty at any time before the Community's
consent to be bound by the agreement is finally expressed.
Unless and until that consent is given, the agreement remains an
envisaged agreement. Consequently, there is nothing to render
this request inadmissible.'
The Council also criticized the Commission's wording of the
questions. The. Council argued that, because the agreement
already had been signed by the Community and the Member States
pursuant to their respective powers, the Commission should not
limit the question to whether the Community may sign and
conclude that agreement." According to the Council, the proper
question is whether "the joint conclusion by the Community and
the Member States of the agreements resulting from the Uruguay
Round is compatible with the division of powers laid down by the
Treaties establishing the European Communities."' 6  The ECJ
rejected both formulations of the questions and stated that the
"fundamental issue is whether or not the Community has exclusive
80. Id. Because this question assumed that the Community had exclusive competence
in all of the areas stated above, the court found it unnecessary to answer it, finding that the
Community did not have exclusive competence in GATS or TRIPS. Id.
81. Ia at 105.
82. Id.
83. EEC TREATY art. 228(6).
84. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 105.
85. ld.
86. 1&.
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competence to conclude the WTO Agreements and its annexes."87
Despite some disagreement over the issue of competence in
the area of ECSC products, the ECJ granted exclusive competence
to the Community. Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty provides that
"the powers of the Governments of Member States in matters of
commercial policy shall not be affected by this Treaty, save as
otherwise provided therein." The ECSC explicitly acknowledges
that Member States retain competence in commercial matters
relating to coal and steel. The ECJ, however, noted that Article 71
of, the ECSC Treaty had been drafted before the European
Economic Community came into existence.8 9 It further noted
that, as it held in Opinion 1/75, Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty
cannot "render inoperative Articled 113 ... of the EEC Treaty
and affect the vesting of power in the Community for the
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the realm
of common commercial policy."'  The ECJ thus held that the
Community has exclusive competence, pursuant to Article 113 of
the EEC Treaty, to conclude the multilateral agreements regarding
trade in goods.
91
Finally, the ECI had two questions that this Article addresses:
(1) whether the Community should have exclusive competence in
the area of GATS; and (2) whether the Community should have
exclusive competence in the area of TRIPS.
A. Article 113 and the Common Commercial Policy
The process of European integration involves the Member
States relinquishing sovereignty over certain policy areas. This
process gives the Community exclusive control over commercial
policy under Chapter X of the EEC Treaty.' Article 113(1) of
the EEC Treaty states:
The common commercial _policy shall be based on uniform
principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates,.the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of
uniformity in 'measures of liberalization, export policy and
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of
87. Id.
88. Treaty Establishing the European Coal Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951.
89. WITO Opinion, supra note 11, at 107, para. 27.
90. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1365, [19761 1 C.M.L.R. 85, 1975 OJ. (C 26818).
91. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 109.
92. See EEC TREATY chapt. X
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dumping or subsidies 3
The Commission contended that this language is broad enough to
encompass the new areas of GATS and TRIPS. The Council,
various Member States, and the EP (which was permitted to submit
observations) vigorously disputed this interpretation. 94
Although the language of Article 113 appears sufficiently
broad to encompass trade in services and trade related intellectual
property, the ECJ had to examine the Treaty as a whole to
determine whether granting exclusive competence to the Com-
munity would ensure compliance with the Treaty.95 The following
sections examine whether the ECJ could have interpreted Article
113 to cover GATS and TRIPS in their entirety.
1. Does Article 113 Cover GATS?
The ECJ in International Agreement on Natural Rubber
stated:
It would no longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile
common commercial policy if the Community were not in a
position to avail itself also of more elaborate means devised with
a view to furthering the development of international trade. It
is therefore not possible to lay down, for Article 113 of the EEC
Treaty, an interpretation of the effect of which would be to
restrict the common commercial policy to the use of instruments
intended to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of
external trade... to the exclusion of more highly developed
mechanisms .... "A commercial policy understood in that sense
would be destined to become nugatory in the course of time."'
As the preceding excerpt indicates, the language of Article 113 is
purposely broad to allow for areas other than traditional trade in
goods to fall within its purview.
In Natural Rubber, the ECJ further stated that the
"enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects covered by commercial
policy.., is conceived as a non-exhaustive enumeration which
must not ... close the door to the application in a Community
context of any other process ... intended to regulate external
93. Id. art. 113(1).
94. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 109.
95. EEC TREATY art. 164. Article 164 states that "the Court of Justice shall ensure
that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." Id.
96. Opinion 1(78, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639.
97. 1979 E.C.R. at 2912, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 639.
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trade."' The Commission, noting the global economy's dominant
trend of trade in services, argued that the open nature of Article
113, as held by the Court in Natural Rubber, prevented the
exclusion of trade in services from the scope of 113.99
The previously noted categorization of the different modes of
trade in services under Article 1(2) of the EEC Treaty becomes
crucial at this point." e In the WTO Opinion, the ECJ noted that
with regard to the first category-cross-frontier supplies-a
supplier established in one country renders the service to a
consumer residing in another. 1' In this scenario "[t]he supplier
does not move to the consumer's country; nor, conversely, does the
consumer move to the supplier's country.' ' "c Such a situation is
difficult to distinguish from traditional trade in goods and should
therefore be included within the realm of Article 1 13 .'0 The
ECJ thus found that the Community has exclusive competence
over cross-frontier supplies.
Regarding the other categories covered under Article 1(2) of
GATS, the ECJ refused to apply the latitude that the Commission
argued it had used in the past. The, ECJ stated:
As regards natural persons, it is clear from Article 3 of the
Treaty, which distinguishes between 'a common commercial
policy' in paragraph (b) and 'measures concerning the entry and
movement of persons' in paragraph (d), that the treatment of
nationals of non-member countries on crossing the external
frontiers of Member States cannot be regarded as falling within
the common commercial policy.10
4
The ECJ concluded, "that the modes of supply of services referred
to by GATS as 'consumption abroad,' 'commercial presence' and
the 'presence of natural persons' are not covered by the common
commercial policy."'05
The ECJ's reasoning is peculiar for three reasons. First, the
ECJ essentially stated that commercial matters and movement of
persons are mutually exclusive because. they are handled in
98. Id.
99. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 110, para. 41.
100. See Final Act, supra note 1, Annex 1B, art. 1(2).
101. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 111, para. 44.
102. Id.
103. let
104. Id. para. 46.
105. 1& para. 47.
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different paragraphs of Article 3 of the EEC Treaty. This is a far
too restrictive reading of a document that is considered the
constitution of the EU.t' 6 This document could not be expected
to foresee specific types of commercial methods that might arise.
Second, the Community has competence over the issuance of
visas to incoming nationals of third-countries. Article 100(c)
empowers and obliges the Community to determine the third-
countries whose nationals will require a visa to enter the Com-
munity."°  Currently, the Council unanimously decides which
third-country nationals should receive visas." s  This decision,
however, will revert to a qualified majority in 1996."
Third, the concern over the issuance of visas pertains to
immigration problems and is not related to commercial issues. The
entry of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member
States as part of immigration policy was generally within the
exclusive domain of the Member States."' This view has been
challenged, however, particularly where the Community's powers
to regulate the legal status of specified categories of third-country
nationals were examined as a result of the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
In Demirel,' l the ECJ interpreted Article 238 of the EEC Treaty
as implying competence to the, Community to extend market
freedoms to nationals of associated States.
11 2
The ECJ's reasoning in the WTO Opinion does not do justice
to the importance of achieving the goals of GATS. Instead, it will
fragment policy-making in the areas of GATS involving the
106. G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 595, 596 (1989).
107. Lane, supra note 45, at 945. Article 100(c), paragraph 1 states that "[t]he Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament, shall determine the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of
a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States." EEC TREATY art.
100(c).
108. Lane, supra note 45, at 945-46.
109. Id. Where events in a third-country are likely to produce a sudden inflow of its
nationals into the Community, the Commission may speedily impose visa requirements.
Id. A uniform visa format is to be adopted by 1996. Id
110. Kay Hailbronner, Visa Regulations and Third-Country Nationals in EC Law, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 969, 971 (1994).
111. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 421 (Admin. Ct.) (Ger.).
112. Id. Article 238 provides that "[t]he Community may conclude with one or more
States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and procedure." EEC TREATY art. 238.
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movement of third-country nationals across Member States'
borders. Although Member States are understandably concerned
about immigration, the .importance of achieving liberalization of
trade in services outweighs such concerns.
2. Does Article 113 of the EEC Treaty Cover TRIPS?
The Commission argued that it has exclusive competence for
TRIPS under Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission
stated that "the rules concerning intellectual property rights are
closely linked to trade in the products and services to which they
apply."0
3
The ECJ in answer first noted that section 4 of part III of
TRIPS, concerning the means of enforcing intellectual property
rights, "contains specific rules as to measures to be applied at
border crossing points."'14 This section of TRIPS has a counter-
part in the provisions of Council Regulation 3842/86 in the
EEC."' This Regulation provides measures for prohibiting the
release of counterfeit goods into free circulation.'1 6 This regula-
tioh falls under the purview of Article 113 because it relates to
measures that customs authorities take in prohibiting the release of
counterfeit goods into free circulation at the external frontiers."'
Thus, the ECJ held that because "measures of that type can be
adopted autonomously by the Community institutions on the basis
of Article 113 of the EC Treaty, it is for the Community alone to
conclude international agreements on such matters."118
Less clear, however, was the ECJ's reasoning on intellectual
property matters not relating to the release of counterfeit goods
into free circulation. The ECJ acknowledged a connection between
intellectual property and trade in goods."9  It noted that
"[i]ntellectual property rights enable those holding them to prevent
third parties from carrying out certain acts."' 20  These acts
include prohibiting use of a trademark, the manufacturing of a
113. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 113, para. 54.
114. Id. para. 55.
115. Council Regulation 3842/86 EEC, 1986 OJ. (L 357) 34.
116. Id.
117. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 113, para. 55.
118. It
119. Id. para. 57.
120. I&
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product, and the copying of a design. 2t  The Court held,
however, that this alone would not bring intellectual property rights
within the scope of Article 113: "Intellectual property rights do not
relate specifically to international trade; they affect internal trade
just as much as, if not more than, international trade."'"
What is troubling is that the ECJ did not explain its rationale
for singling out internal trade as a justification for holding that
TRIPS involves areas of Member States' competence. Arguably,
Article 36 provides an exception to Article 30's prohibition against
"quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect" between Member States."2 On the one hand,
Article 30 lays down the fundamental principle of the free
movement of goods. On the other hand, Article 36 safeguards
intellectual property rights, which, owing to their territorial nature,
inevitably create obstacles to the free movement of goods. 24 The
EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(Directive) has further limited the ability to use an Article 36
exception in the area of intellectual property."2 Nevertheless,
subsequent case law has limited the Article 36 exception with the
recognition that Articles 30 and 36 articulate a conflict between
two competing interests.26 The Directive harmonizes the laws
protecting computer programs Community-wide.
The ECJ stated that the Commission itself had conceded that
no Community harmonization measures exist in some of the fields
laid down by TRIPS. 27 The above discussion on the Directive,
121. hd
122. Id
123. Notably, "the authors of the [EEC] Treaty were clearly aware of the provisions
of... [GATT] when they drafted Articles 30 to 36." See Eric L. white, In Search of the
Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235,239 (1989). Article
XI, paragraph 1 of GATT is entitled "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,"
and the language is similar to that of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. Id at 239-40.
Similarly, paragraph 2 of Article XI of GATT provides for certain exceptions, which are
listed in Article XX. Id at 240. "This latter provision contains remarkable similarities to
Article 36 [of the EEC Treaty]." Id
124. Id
125. Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 1991 OJ. (L 122/42) 17, reprinted in BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT
J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN EUROPE-A GUIDE TO THE
EC DIRECTIVE 203 (1991).
126. See Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GFAG, 3 C.M.LR. 571 (Fed. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (Ger.).
127. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 113, para. 58.
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however, would tend to dispute the absence of Community
harmonization measures in the area of TRIPS. In fact, the legal
basis of the Directive, as stated in the Directive's Appendix I, is
Article 100(a). 12 The Community is competent to harmonize
Member States' laws in the area of intellectual property pursuant
to Articles 100 and 100(a).' 29
Article 235 also may be used to superimpose new rights on
national rights, as it was in the Council Regulation of December
20, 1993 on Community Trademark. 3 ' Exclusive competence on
an internal level would allow the Community to exercise exclusive
competence in external matters, such as the WTO. The ECJ,
however, made clear that the processes set out in the Treaty, under
which these powers are granted to the Community, cannot be
usurped merely because the act would benefit the common market.
The ECJ stated:
If the Community were to be recognized as having exclusive
competence to enter into agreements with non-member
countries to harmonize the protection of intellectual property
and, at the same time, to achieve harmonization at Community
level, the Community institutions would be able to escape the
internal constraints to which they are subject in relation to
procedures and to rules as to voting.
13t
128. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 125, app. I. continues, noting that
[t]he [Directive] will favour the free circulation of coinputer programs in so far
as industry in those countries with clear and established protection of computer
programs is currently in a more favorable position than that in countries where
protection is uncertain; such differences in legal protection distort the conditions
of establishment and of competition in Member States for firms which engage in
activities concerned with computer programs.... In addition, by harmonizing the
conditions under which the results of research and development in the computer
program field are legally protected on a uniform basis in the Member States,
innovation and technical progress throughout the Community will be encouraged.
Id. para. 5A.
129. EEC TREATY art. 100. Article 100 states that the Council shall, acting unanimous-
ly on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws,
regulations, or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the es-
tablishment or functioning of the common market. Id (emphasis added). Article 100(a)
provides other procedural guidelines for the approximation of laws. Id.
130. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 113, para. 59. Article 235 states that "[i]f action
by the Community should prove necessary to attain ... one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly,
take appropriate measures." EEC TREATY art. 235.
131. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 114, para. 60.
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This stance appears consistent with some commentators' views
of the ECJ's current role in the Community.' Although the
ECJ played a crucial role in shaping the Community with some of
its early decisions, other organs of the Community have now taken
from the ECJ the constitution-building role.1 13 The ECJ's WTO
Opinion appears in stark contrast to these earlier opinions, and
perhaps needlessly so, because the Treaty contains adequate
grounds for finding exclusive competence for the Community.
B. Comparing the U.S. Approach to Competence Relating to
International Treaties: Missouri v. Holland
The United States has adopted a different approach to
competence between the federal government and the individual
states regarding international treaties; this is not surprising because
the United States has a federal government that has been
developing for two hundred years. The individual states
completely ceded their sovereignty in the realm of international
agreements. A side effect of this arrangement is that the federal
government can achieve domestic policy goals through inter-
national treaties that it normally could not achieve through
statutes. An example of this phenomenon appears in Missouri v.
Holland"u 4
Missouri v. Holland involved the Treaty for the Protection of
Migratory Birds between the United States and Great Britain. t35
The Treaty bound both powers to propose to their law-making
bodies the necessary measures for carrying out the purpose of the
Treaty. Pursuant to the Treaty, the United States passed an act
that prohibited the killing, capturing, or selling of any of the
migratory birds included in the terms of the Treaty.'36
132. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 123.
133. Id. See also Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425
(Ger.) (establishing the doctrine of supremacy of EC law); Case 26/62, Nederlandse Ad-
ministrative der Belastingen v. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 3 C.M.L.IR 105
(Neth.) (establishing the principle of direct effect, which allows individuals in the Member
States to rely on EC law); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
ffir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649,663 [1978] 3 C.M.L.L 494 (Ger.) (holding that a product
lawfully marketed in one Member State could not be banned in another State, except for
limited exceptions articulated in Article 36).
134. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
135. Treaty for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.K.-U.S., 39 Stat.
1702.
136. Migratory Birds Treaty, July 3, 1918, U.S.-U.K., 40 Stat. 755.
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The State of Missouri brought a bill in equity preventing a
U.S. game warden from enforcing the act. The state argued that
the statute was an unconstitutional interference with the rights
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Missduri
reasoned:
Under the ancient law, the feudal law, and the common law in
England, the absolute control of wild game was a necessary
incident of sovereignty. When, therefore, the United Colonies
became "Free and Independent States" with full power to do all
"acts and things which Independent States may of right do," the
power to control the taking of wild game passed to the
States."37
Missouri further argued that "[w]hen the power of the States over
their purely internal affairs is destroyed, the system of government
devised by the Constitution is destroyed.'
138
Indeed, the district court had. held invalid an act of Congress,
created before any treaty, which attempted to regulate the killing
of migratory birds within the states.'39 The court reasoned that
migratory birds were owned by the states in their sovereign
capacity for the benefit of their people and that this control was
one that Congress could not displace.4
The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland held that, although
it was true that, as between a state and its inhabitants, the state
may regulate the killing and sale of migratory birds, "it does not
follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers."''
Valid treaties "are as binding within the territorial limits of the
States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the
United States." 4 2 In the U.S. Constitution, the supreme law of
the land consists of three things: (1) the Constitution; (2) the laws
of the United States made in pursuance thereof; and (3) all treaties
made or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States. 43
In Missouri v. Holland, the Solicitor-General argued that
"[t]he power of Congress to make treaties effective is not limited
137. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 417.
138. Id. at. 420.
139. Id. at 432.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 432.
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to the subjects with respect to which it is empowered to legislate
in purely domestic affairs."' 44
Since the power was expressly granted to'Congress to enact
legislation necessary and proper to put into execution a treaty,
the validity of such legislation cannot depend upon whether its
subject-matter is included within the general legislative powers
of Congress. Rather, it depends upon whether the treaty which
is being enforced is within the treaty-making power of the
United States.45
Therefore, so long as the treaty is within the treaty-making power
of the United States, Congress can enact any legislation that is
"necessary and proper" to accomplish the goals of the treaty, even
if such legislation would not have been permissible in a purely
domestic setting.
If the ECJ had adopted this rationale in its WTO Opinion, the
ability to legislate in the areas of GATS and TRIPS would
undoubtedly fit in the category of "necessary and proper" to
accomplish the proper execution of the WTO Agreement.
Furthermore, the EEC Treaty contains language that the ECJ
could have used to render a decision consistent with Missouri v.
Holland. The Commission raised Article 235 as an argument for
finding exclusive competence for the Community. Article 235
provides that "[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary
to attain ... one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission... take
appropriate measures."'46 The argument that the Member States
still hold some competence in the areas of GATS and TRIPS then
becomes subordinate to the Community's interest of achieving the
goals of the WTO.
The EU, however, is not a federal system, and the Member
States retain more sovereignty than do the states in the United
States. Some commentators accuse the ECJ of engaging in
excessive judicial activism. 47 Without exclusive competence in
the areas of GATS and TRIPS, however, the Community will not
144. Id. at 424.
145. Id at 425; Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891).
146. EEC TREATY art. 235.
147. See Mancini, supra note 106, at 180 (citing Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R.
585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (Ger.)).
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achieve the benefits of the WTO. Therefore, in this case, a 'little
judicial activism might be advantageous.
V. WHAT EFFECT WILL THE ECJ's DECISION HAVE ON THE
EU's ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WTO?
At the hearing for the determination of competencies under
the WTO, the Commission called the ECJ's attention to problems
that would arise with the administration of agreements if the
Community and the Member States shared competence in GATS
and TRIPS." The second paragraph of Article C of the EEC
Treaty stipulates:
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its
external activities as a whole in the context of its external
relations, security, economic and development policies. The
Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these
policies, each in accordance with its prospective powers.
149
Undoubtedly, the decision of the ECJ on the issue of competence
under the WTO will make ensuring consistency in. external
activities a difficult task.
The Committee of Permanent Representatives' 50 requested
that the Council prepare a working document containing a
preliminary analysis of the detailed arrangements for participation
of the Community and the Member States in the WTO.' The
Council's Legal Service predicted some form of shared competence
before the ECJ's decision on competence. The Council identified
some of the problems and solutions in its report. The Commission,
on the other hand, identified problems that would occur if the
Community was not granted exclusive competence.
A. External Cohesion
Article J.1(4) of the EEC Treaty states that the Member States
"shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of
the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force
148. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 599, para. 106.
149. EEC TREATY art. C, para. 2.
150. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is composed of senior
civil servants from the Member States who assist in preparing and managing the work of
the Council. See Peters, supra note 15, at 79-85.
151. Legal Service Note, supra note 23.
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in international relations." '152 The participation of fifteen Mem-
ber States, each concerned with its own national interests, would
seriously impair the effectiveness of the EU as a cohesive force in
the WTO. This self-interest would undermine the rationale of
Article 113. The EU must act as a union in order to be effective
in the international arena.
The Council, however, maintained that the question of
Member State competence, particularly in the area of intellectual
property, was not in dispute until the Commission raised it with
regard to the WTO. The Council further stated that the Member
States have consistently exercised their competence at the inter-
national level, for example in the WIPO.53 This involvement
allegedly "has not prevented the progressive development of
internal Community law and of international action by the Com-
munity."'"M In its own Legal Service Note, the Council refers to
the ECJ's International Labour Organization Opinion, which
stressed:
[Agreement may be concluded in an area where] competence is
shared between the Community and the Member-States. In
such a case, negotiation and implementation of the agreement
require joint action by the Community and the Member
States .... When it appears that the subject matter of an
agreement or contract falls in part within the competence of the
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is
important to ensure that there is close association between
institutions of the Community and the Member States both in
the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment
of the obligations entered into. The duty of co-
operation ... results from the requirement of unity in the
international representation of the Community.'
This language creates a legal obligation to find formulae that
"ensure 'consistency' of the EU's external action, while ensuring
'joint action' by the Community and the Member States and 'close
association' between the Member States and the Community
152. EEC TREATY art. J.1(4).
153. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6932 (as amended 1979).
154. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 86.
155. Case 2/91, Re International Labour Organization Convention 170 on Chemicals at
Work, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 800.
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institutions. 15 6
Significant problems in the Community's negotiating
procedures under the old GATr, however, posed considerable
constraints on the negotiators and caused enormous confusion. An
example is an incident that involved the French representative in
the oil-seeds dispute under GATT. During the discussions on the
establishment of a panel, the representative for the Community
asked the Chairman of the proceedings to allow France to express
its views on the oil-seeds issue." The French representative
stated:
In the present circumstances... where important measures in
the agricultural sector had recently been taken by big trading
partners, [the French government] would want to make an
overall assessment of the agricultural disputes connected to the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Accordingly, France could not
agree at the present meeting to the establishment of a panel as
requested by the United States."5 '
The French delegation then requested that the Community take
note that contracting parties lacked consensus and therefore could
not establish a panel. 59
The EEC representative responded that although France was
a contracting party to the Treaty, France no longer had com-
petence on matters of trade policy. He further explained that the
Community had exclusive competence in this area and the
Commission of the EEC represented the Community in the
Council of GATT by the Commission of the EEC. "The issue of
representation had arisen from the very outset, and it was in that
way that the Community had assumed the competence that the
member States no longer assumed on .a national basis. ' '
It would be a most unwise course to introduce an element of
insecurity into what had been accomplished in this institution in
the past .... The Community had assumed responsibility for
trade policy on behalf of the Member States; that was the
guarantee and the security for other contracting parties. To take
the French views into consideration would put into question all
156. Legal Service Note, supra note 23, at 6.
157. Payments and'Subsidies Paid, supra note 22, at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 11.
160. Id. at 13.
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the current Community's obligations and rights.'61
The growing complexity of the WTO increases the areas
covered and will undoubtedly cause further confusion, thereby
making the EU a very difficult partner to deal with in the WTO.
1. "Spokesperson" for the Community and the Member States
Given the problems mentioned above, the importance of the
EU presenting a united front is clear. The Community must devise
a method of speaking with one voice-even in matters involving
GATS and TRIPS. The Council proposed that the best and
simplest formula for instituting a single spokesperson would be to
retain the Commission in its traditional role. From the beginning
of the Uruguay Round, the Commission was the single spokesper-
son for issues within the Community's competence and issues
falling within the competence of the Member States. 62 The
Council noted that it would be desirable for the Commission to
continue to act as the spokesperson in matters relating to the WTO
as a whole, in particular vis-a-vis the EU's external partners.1'
This formula does not require a significant conceptual leap because
the Commission merely carries out the predetermined mandate of
the Council, which is composed of representatives of the Member
State governments.'"6 In fact, the Council carefully distinguished
the question of the role of the "spokesperson" from that of internal
procedures within the EU. This distinction of roles is necessary for
deciding what the spokesperson should express, negotiate or
possibly agree.'6-
2. Internal Procedures for Defining the Positions to be
Adopted within the WTO
The ECJ recognized that where it is apparent that the subject
matter of an agreement or convention falls partly within the
competence of the Community and partly within that of the
Member States, "it is essential to ensure close cooperation between
the Member States and the Community institutions, both in the
process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the
161. Legal Service Note, supra note 23, at 14.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 28 (explaining the make-up function of the Council).
165. Legal Service Note, supra note 23, at 7.
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commitments entered into."'" The ECJ, however, did not
provide any structure for this cooperation between the Member
States and the Community, leaving the institutional mechanisms
provided in the EEC Treaty to ultimately resolve this matter.
Indeed, the ECJ in International Labour Organization Convention
170 on Chemicals at Work stipulated that the Community
institutions and the Member States must take all measures
necessary to ensure cooperation between the two in areas involving
shared competency.' 67
In its Legal Service Note, the Council suggested an overall
political solution for voting procedures to be applied to decision-
making in the areas of GATS and TRIPS. 6  The suggested
solution would apply qualified majority voting in areas where the
Community has competence and the Treaty provides for such
voting in articles such as 113.69 The suggested solution requires
unanimity where the Member states have competence. The
Council, however, recognized that the latter solution would run
into difficulties for two reasons:
(i) owing to the possible divergence of views among Member
States and between the Member States and the Community
institutions with regard, in each instance, to the allocation
of powers between the Community and the Member States;
and
(ii) because, in a field in which powers are shared between the
Community and the Member States, a single issue could
fall simultaneously within the competence of the Com-
munity and that of the Member States.
70
The Legal Service Note distinguished between cases where
Member States jointly exercised their powers with those of the
Community and cases where Member States exercised their powers
separately. The Legal Service Note also-suggested that the most
expedient solution is for there to be one procedure for ad-
ministering GATS and another for administering TRIPS.'
The above discussion hints at the difficulty of establishing a
166. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 123, para. 108.
167. Case 2/91, Re International Labour Organization Convention 170 on Chemicals at
Work, 3 C.M.L.R. 800 (1993).
168. Legal Service Note, supra note 23, at 7.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Id
171. Id at 9.
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coherent method of coordinating the positions of the Member
States and the Community in the areas of GATS and TRIPS. The
confusion that served as the basis for the Commission's argument
to be granted exclusive competence is very likely to ultimately
hamper the Community's ability to participate effectively in the
WTO.
B. The Issue of Dispute Settlement
The issue of dispute settlement in the WTO, where GATS and
TRIPS are involved, has two aspects: (1) third-countries bringing
actions against either the Community or individual Member States,
depending on who has competence in a particular area; and (2) the
Community or a Member State bringing an action against third
parties, again depending on the division of competence. Shared
competence between the Community and the Member States
makes it difficult for third parties wishing to bring an action for a
violation of GATS or TRIPS to determine who the appropriate
parties are, causing confusion in the dispute settlement system of
the WTO. In many cases, the boundaries of competence are
blurred and may involve both the Member States and the Com-
munity.
The Legal Service Note was unhelpful in outlining a solution
for this problem, except to state that the Community "cannot
impose on third-countries which are our partners in the [WTO] the
burden of analyzing the respective powers of the Community and
its Member States."'7 2 Furthermore, it states that "[a] formal
undertaking in the [WTO] on the part of the Community and its
Member States not to oppose acceptance of a complaint for
reasons of 'powers' (distribution of powers between the Com-
munity and its Member States) therefore seems necessary."
173
This ensures that issues of distribution of competencies remain an
internal matter for the Community and the Member States, and
does not hamper the implementation of the dispute settlement
machinery by third parties. 74
Member States wishing to bring action against a third party for
infringement of their rights under GATS or TRIPS also may
trigger cross-retaliation. Cross-retaliation may prove difficult in the
172. Id. at 9-10.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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EU because
if a Member State, within its sphere of competence, had been
duly authorized to take cross-retaliation measures but considered
that they would be ineffective if taken in the fields covered by
GATS or TRIPS, it would lack the power under Community law
to retaliate in the area of trade in goods, since that area
falls... within the exclusive competence of the Community by
virtue of Article 113 of the Treaty.
175
For example, if a GATT panel authorized France to cross-
retaliate against the United States for a violation of GATS, France
would not be able to cross-retaliate in areas outside the limited
competence that the ECJ has granted it. In such a case, the
Member State would have to request the Community to retaliate
on its behalf, which further complicates matters both within the EU
and for its trading partners.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ECJ's opinion on the issue of competence under the
WTO leaves many questions unanswered. The ECJ could have
granted the Community exclusive competence over the entire
WTO for purposes of concluding agreements, including the newly
formed GATS and TRIPS. The Commission made sound, legal
arguments as to why the Community should have exclusive
competence. So why did the ECJ find against the Commission and
fragment GATS and TRIPS along complicated and seemingly
arbitrary lines? The answer may be that the ECJ is backing down
from its somewhat controversial activist role. Also, one should
note that the EU is not a federal structure, even though it posses-
ses many federal characteristics. The Community would be most
efficient if it had the power to pursue any legislation "necessary
and proper" to achieve the goals of a treaty, but the Community
has not evolved to the point where the Member States are willing
to grant the Community such latitude.
The Community does have the power to harmonize the laws
in the areas of services and intellectual property within the EU,
which would lead to corresponding competence in these areas in
the international arena. The Community, however, must achieve
these harmonization measures through institutional channels and
175. WTO Opinion, supra note 11, at 64.
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with constant input of the Member States, who essentially shape
the end result.
The problems stemming from this sharing of competence
undoubtedly will limit the Community's effectiveness in the WTO.
The Community institutions will have to formulate the framework
for dealing with shared competence. This framework is likely to be
unwieldy, causing future confusion for both the Member States of
the Community and their trading partners in the WTO.
